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ARBITRATION OF HEALTH AND SAFETY
ISSUES IN THE WORKPLACE:
EMPLOYEES WHO REFUSE WORK
ASSIGNMENTS BECAUSE OF FEAR OF
AIDS CONTAGION
Madelyn C. Squire*
I. INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM FROM Two PERSPECTIVES
A vacationing couple fears the popcorn they bought at a gas
station is contaminated. A woman panics when an employee
sneezes while scooping her ice cream. A man wonders if he could
be infected by shaking hands. Some worry about using public
restrooms or hot tubs or being bitten by mosquitoes.'
Every day the National AIDS Hotline, the world's largest health
information telephone service, receives more than 3,000 calls from
people with concerns such as these. These queries might seem sur-
prising. when one considers that the public has been inundated with
information from the medical community on how AIDS is transmit-
ted.' However, a survey conducted by the federal government's Na-
tional Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) found that mispercep-
tions about casual transmission of AIDS persist in one-third of the
adult population.2 NCHS's 1990 survey revealed the following
findings:
[T]he percentage of adults who correctly said that it was "very un-
likely" or "not possible" to get AIDS or AIDS virus infection from
* Professor of Law, Howard University School of Law. B.S., Bethune-Cookman
College, 1966; M.A., Atlanta University, 1968; J.D., Howard University, 1974.
The writer wishes to thank Lauren Z. Medlock, J.D., Howard University, 1988,
whose research discussion provided the seed for this Article.
1. Cristine Russell, What Do You Know About AIDS?., WASINGTON PosT, Feb. 5.
1991, Health, at 7.
2. AIDS was first identified in 1981 and was initially mistaken for Kaposi's sar-
coma, a disease to which AIDS victims are particularly susceptible. In 1982 the name
"acquired immune deficiency syndrome" was adopted as the broader dimensions of
the disease became known. The term AIDS in this Article refers to individuals who
have (or are regarded as having) Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome ("AIDS") or
AIDS related complex ("ARC") or who test positive for AIDS antibodies. Medical
evidence indicates that the three primary modes of transmitting the AIDS virus are
sexual contact, needle-sharing among intravenous drug users, and in utero transmis-
sion from infected pregnant women to their fetuses. For a brief introduction to how
the AIDS virus can be transmitted, see Jana Howard Carey and Megan M. Arthur.
The Developing Law on AIDS in the Workplace, 46 MD L REV 284, 284-88 (1987);
Robert P. Wasson, Jr., AIDS Discrimination Under Federal, State. and Local Law
After Arline, 15 FLA_ ST U.L. REV. 221, 222-27 (1987); and Arthur S. Leonard, AIDS
and Employment Law Revisited, 14 HOFSTRA L REv 11, 16-20 (1985).
3. Russell, supra note 1.
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eating in a restaurant with an HIV-infected cook was only 55 per-
cent; from sharing utensils with someone infected, 47 percent; from
being coughed or sneezed on by an infected person, 47 percent;
from mosquitoes or other insects, 43 percent; and from using public
toilets, 61 percent.'
Even more interesting is that about three-fourths of those sur-
veyed said AIDS could not be transmitted by working with an in-
fected person.' This indicates that a quarter of the adult population,
a fairly sizable number, would have some problems working with a
person who has AIDS.' Fear of contracting a disease generally re-
garded as fatal, and linked in the minds of many people to negative
moral implications accounts for persistent attitudes of unacceptance
and distrust of medical information regarding the transmission of
the AIDS virus.7
If history is any indicator, it has never been the nature of man to
be gracious in the face of perceived life-threatening disease
epidemics." Carriers of contagious diseases have suffered an unfortu-
nate fate from time immemorial. Leviticus in the Old Testament
pronounced a harsh fate for the leper: "The leper, his clothes shall
be rent, and his head bare, and he shall put a covering on his upper
lip, and shall cry, Unclean, unclean. . . . [H]e shall dwell
alone. . . ."I Civilized society has not changed much in its treat-
ment of carriers of contagious diseases. AIDS victims can attest to
4. Russell, supra note 1. When competing teams of French and American scien-
tists isolated the virus different names were used to identify it. In 1986 an interna-
tional committee of scientists agreed upon the name Human Immunodeficiency Virus
(HIV).
,5. Id.
6. In another study, the New York Business Group on Health (NYBGH) surveyed
3,460 employees and found that even though the employees were knowledgeable
about AIDS transmission, 25 percent to 33 percent surveyed said they would be un-
comfortable eating lunch with someone with AIDS. Workers Still Express Fear of
Contacting AIDS at Work, 19 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) No. 19, at 824 (Oct. 11, 1989).
7. See Scott Burris, Comment, Fear Itself: AIDS, Herpes and Public Health De-
cisions, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 479, 504 & n.136 (1985) (reviewing the law governing
state action in assessing and responding to public health threats and evaluating how
the law acts to reconcile divergent views, e.g., scientific vs. ill-informed, in matters
presenting threats to public health).
8. See Anne C. Roark, Familiar Pattern; AIDS Adds to History of Epidemics,
Los ANGELES TIMES, Feb. 23, 1986, at 1, for a historical look at some of the major
human disease epidemics (e.g., leprosy, Black Death, and the influenza outbreak of
1918-19). The article posits that:
"[N]early every ... virulent outbreak of illness seems to carry with it not
one but two epidemics: the physical manifestations of the disease itself and
society's often predictable reactions to it-denial at first, followed by hyste-
ria, a search for scapegoats, an onrush of commercial exploiters and, finally,
though not always, improved health standards and scientific insights that
significantly prolong life expectancies."
9. Id. (quoting Leviticus 13:45-46 (King James)).
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this fact. Modern man has proposed legislating restrictions on the
activities of AIDS victims,"' bringing felony charges against AIDS
victims if they have had sexual relations with anyone except another
AIDS victim, and tattooing the AIDS victim.'
Horror stories concerning the abuse suffered by the AIDS victim
in the workplace are plentiful. There have been numerous reports
about employees who have refused to work with or touch the AIDS
worker, or use the same bathroom, telephone, water fountain, or
pencil. It was reported that one AIDS victim was not even allowed
to use his pregnant co-worker's word processor; she claimed she had
once seen him sweat on the keyboard. 2
Paul Cronan became painfully aware that his employer of twelve
years, the New England Telephone Company, had breached his pri-
vacy by divulging in large group meetings of employees that he had
AIDS. Shortly thereafter, Cronan received calls from co-workers
who threatened to lynch him if he returned to work. Cronan sued
his employer for breach of privacy and discrimination on the basis
of his physical disability.1 3 The case was settled out of court. Cronan
was reassigned to the company's Needham, Massachusetts facility.
In an interview, Ellen Boyd, spokeswoman for the company, de-
scribed the work atmosphere as one where "fear was rampant among
our employees." '
The notorious Department of Justice "Cooper memorandum,"'1
written as a response to a request from the Department of Health
and Human Services on the applicability of section 504 of the Reha-
bilitation Act of 197316 to AIDS victims, appeared to lend support to
this negative workplace atmosphere. The memorandum concluded
that an AIDS victim who was otherwise qualified to work would not
10. Panic Fuels AIDS Initiative, UPI, Aug. 4, 1986, available in LEXIS, Nexis
library, OMNI file. UPI reported that the Prevent AIDS Now Initiative Committee
(PANIC), comprised of supporters of political extremist Lyndon LaRouche, was seek-
ing passage in California of a controversial initiative that would have restricted activi-
ties of AIDS victims. Shockingly, the measure received 500,000 valid voter signatures.
well above the 394,000 needed to qualify for the ballot.
11. AIDS Letters Insult Victims Too Sick for Sex, UPI, Oct. 19, 1985. available
in LEXIS, Nexis library, OMNI file.
12. Meryl Davids, Panic Prevention, Pun. REL J, Mar. 1987, at 18.
13. Cronan v. New England Tel. Co., 41 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1273 (Mass.
Super. Ct. 1986).
14. Joan O'C. Hamilton et al., The AIDS Epidemic and Business, Bus WK, Mar.
23, 1987, at 122.
15. Charles J. Cooper, Memo from Assistant Attorney General Cooper on Applica-
tion of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act to Persons with AIDS, Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 122, at D-1 (June 25, 1986). The opinion was written for the general coun-
sel of the Department of Health and Human Services.
16. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988). Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 prohibits
recipients of federal financial assistance under any program or activity from discrimi-
nating against a handicapped individual solely by reason of his or her handicap,
where that individual is "otherwise qualified" to perform the work.
1992]
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be protected from discrimination motivated by fear of contagion, be-
cause the statute prohibited only discrimination motivated solely by
reason of the disabling aspects of the disease.
School Board of Nassau County v. Arline17 rescued AIDS victims
from a precarious employment future after the Cooper memoran-
dum. Although the plaintiff in Arline was afflicted with tuberculosis,
the case brought before the Supreme Court the question of whether
a person afflicted with a contagious disease came within the protec-
tion of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The Court con-
strued section 504 as not intended to exclude those with contagious
diseases who are otherwise qualified to perform the essential func-
tions of the job.1 8 Arline was a philosophical win for all persons af-
flicted with contagious diseases. Writing for the Court, Justice Wil-
liam Brennan emphatically rejected the analytical position taken by
the Cooper memorandum. Brennan concluded that "[a]llowing dis-
crimination based on the contagious effects of a physical impairment
would be inconsistent with the basic purpose of section 504, which is
to ensure that handicapped individuals are not denied jobs or other
benefits because of the prejudiced attitudes or the ignorance of
others."' 9
The specific question of whether AIDS is a handicap within the
meaning of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 was given a
positive answer in Chalk v. United States District Court.2 Addi-
tionally, there is other federal and state legislation that accords pro-
tection to AIDS victims.2 Nevertheless, it may be a hollow victory
for the AIDS victim to know that she cannot be fired because of her
handicap, or, if fired for that sole reason, that she must be rein-
stated. Laws alone cannot change a workplace atmosphere where
fear of the AIDS victim is present. An employer faces a dilemma
when confronted by a worker who refuses an assignment out of fear
of contagion from working with an AIDS victim.2 The AIDS victim
17. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
18. The Court stated its test: a person who poses a significant risk of communicat-
ing an infectious disease to others in the workplace will not be otherwise qualified for
his or her job if reasonable accommodation will not otherwise eliminate that risk. Id.
at 287 n.16.
19. Id. at 284.
20. 840 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1987) (teacher sued, claiming that reassignment out of
classroom violated § 504; reassignment enjoined on appeal; held error to require that
every theoretical possibility of harm be disproved; id. at 704-09).
21. A discussion on that issue is beyond the scope of this Article. The following
articles are suggested for their coverage of this subject: Bonnie P. Tucker, The Amer-
icans With Disabilities Act: An Overview, 1989 U. ILL. L. REv 923; Arthur S. Leo-
nard, AIDS, Employment and Unemployment, 49 OHIO ST. L.J 929 (1989); Carey
and Arthur, supra note 2; Wasson, supra note 2.
22. There are sundry possible fact patterns in which such AIDS-related work situ-
ations could arise. See, e.g., Stepp v. Indiana Empl. Sec. Div., 521 N.E.2d 350 (Ind.
1988), in which the employee-laboratory technician refused to perform tests on speci-
[Vol. 44:315
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cannot be fired but the refusing employee can. The employer is
faced with a Hobson's choice, and the refusing employee must go. In
many cases the refusing employee is a long-time worker who has
performed, at the least, in a satisfactory manner. Even though the
employee's fear may appear to others as irrational, to the refusing
employee her fear is very real. In many instances, the news media
and even the scientific community have played not a small role in
inciting the fear."
In the early period, AIDS was thought to be a "gay disease ' ' 24 that
posed little or no risk to the general public. Women specifically were
supposed to be outside the infection risk, even if they engaged in
unprotected sex. By the end of 1984 a new apprehension had taken
hold among medical experts-AIDS now was understood to pose a
threat to the heterosexual community. What worried the public was
that experts had only theories of how heterosexual transmission
might occur, but no one knew precisely.2 5 Adding to a growing pub-
lic panic was a study by Masters and Johnson which reported a the-
oretical possibility of getting the virus from kissing, from contact
with blood in a touch football game or on the soccer field, or even
from a toilet seat. The two researchers warned of this risk of inad-
vertent viral infection, 8 a provocative finding that appeared to be
supported by scientists' earlier detection of the virus in human tears
and saliva."
When the cause of AIDS was discovered in 1984,28 Margaret
Heckler, then Secretary of Health and Human Services, boldly pre-
dicted at a Washington press conference that America would pro-
duce a vaccine against the ravaging disease within two years.2" Many
members of the public subsequently felt betrayed by medical ex-
mens with AIDS warning labels attached; Minnesota Dep't of Corrections, 85 Lab.
Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1185 (1985) (Gallagher. Arb.), where a guard refused to obey an
order to conduct a "pat search" after an inmate was diagnosed as having the AIDS
virus. This Article's focus is on the work situation where a co-worker refuses an as-
signment which brings her into contact with a fellow employee-AIDS victim. How-
ever, information presented in the Article is applicable to other AIDS-related work
situations as well.
23. An employer may also incite an employee's fear. See infra text accompanying
notes 112-13.
24. The disease was first called gay-related immune deficiency or GRID.
25. Lawrence K. Altman, Heterosexuals and AIDS: New Data Examined, N Y
Tnms, Jan. 22, 1985, at C3.
26. WILLIAM H. MASTERS. VIRGINIA E. JOHNSON AND ROBERT C KOLODNY. CRISIs
HETEROSEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE AGE OF AIDS 25, 32, 93-94 (1988).
27. Altman, supra note 25.
28. Luc Montagnier and his colleagues at the Pasteur Institute in Paris and Rob-
ert C. Gallo and his colleagues at the National Cancer Institute are credited With
isolating the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV). For a historical report on the
discovery and tracking of the virus, see William L. Heyward and James W. Curran,
The Epidemiology of AIDS in the U.S., Sci AM, Oct. 1988, at 72.
29. Laurie Garrett, The First Faint Omen, NEWSDAY, June 7, 1988, at 3.
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perts, who, failing at the attempt to produce such a vaccine, finally
announced the unlikelihood of a vaccine or cure before the year
2000.30 With no promise of an early vaccine, Americans found that
they faced an additional risk of infection from their own health in-
stitutions as evidence emerged that the AIDS virus could be trans-
mitted through blood transfusions, organ transplants, and artificial
insemination." Moreover, the debate among some members of the
scientific community as to whether the AIDS virus could be trans-
mitted by insects alarmed the public. Articles in reputable general-
circulation magazines supported such a possibility.32
A forecast by the National Academy of Sciences that the next ten
years of the AIDS epidemic will be worse and more complex than
the first decade has served to intensify public fear.3 3 This situation
is exacerbated by widespread public frustration and helplessness; al-
though the scientific community has reported substantial progress in
learning about the disease, there is also a sense that the disease con-
tinues to outrun the gains in medical knowledge.3
4
Morbidity statistics have become the harbinger of an accelerated
AIDS epidemic for the 1990s. The Centers for Disease Control
(CDC) estimate that 1 million to 1.5 million Americans harbor the
AIDS virus and that by this year approximately 365,000 Americans
will have been diagnosed as having AIDS, and 263,000 of those with
AIDS will have died.3 5
How does all this translate to the workplace? It means more and
more employers will be faced with the prospect of conflicting inter-
ests between AIDS victims and employees who, because of fear, re-
fuse assignments that will bring them into contact with carriers of
the virus. There are legal protections for the AIDS victim. But what,
if any, protection does the fearful employee have?
An employee who has been disciplined and discharged for refusing
a work assignment because of fear of contagion from an AIDS victim
may look to a collective bargaining agreement, or the Occupational
Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA),3 8 or section 502 of the La-
30. Id.
31. Australian Women Get AIDS From Artificial Insemination, Reuters Ltd.,
July 25, 1985, available in LEXIS, Nexis library, OMNI file.
32. See, e.g., Katie Leishman, AIDS and Insects, THE ATLANTIC, Sept. 1987, at 56.
33. Michael Specter, U.S. Report Predicts Wider Spread of AIDS, WASHINGTON
POST, June 21, 1990, at A3.
34. See Philip J. Hilts, 3,000 Papers at AIDS Gathering Point to Gains and
Frustration, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1990, at CI.
35. DONALD H. J. HERMANN & WILLIAM P. SCHURGIN, THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF AIDS,
§ 1.03 (1991) (citing Centers for Disease Control, AIDS Weekly Surveillance Report:
United States AIDS Program (Mar. 31, 1989)).
36. See 29 U.S.C. § 660(c) (1988) and 29 C.F.R. § 1977.12(b) (1991). OSHA pro-
tects the right of an employee to refuse to perform a work assignment where (1) the
employee is ordered to work under conditions that the employee reasonably believes
pose an imminent risk of death or serious bodily injury, and (2) the employee has
[Vol. 44:315
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bor Management Relations Act 37 and section 7 of the National La-
bor Relations Act (NLRA)38 for protection. Prospects for success
under each weigh heavily on evidentiary questions in relation to
tests or standards with which the statutes require compliance.
This Article focuses on whether the arbitration provision within a
collective bargaining agreement offers viable protection to an em-
ployee who is disciplined or discharged 9 for refusing a work assign-
ment with an AIDS victim. Specifically, this Article (1) reviews stan-
dards arbitrators apply in refusal-to-work cases involving health and
safety issues, (2) evaluates how these standards operate when ap-
reason to believe that there is not sufficient time or opportunity to seek effective
redress from his employer or to apprise OSHA of the danger. See Whirlpool Corp. v.
Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 19 (1980). An employee who has been disciplined or discharged
for refusing to work with an AIDS victim more than likely will be unsuccessful in a
claim against her employer under the OSHA regulation. In view of the extensive cov-
erage and distribution of medical information on AIDS transmission, an employee
would encounter evidentiary problems proving "reasonable belier' of the risk of
contagion.
37. See Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 502 (codified at 29
U.S.C. § 143 (1988)). Under section 502 employees do not violate the no-strike clause
in their collective bargaining agreement when they refuse, either collectively or indi-
vidually, to work "in good faith because of abnormally dangerous conditions." None-
theless, an employee relying on section 502 is confronted with evidentiary problems
similar to those in OSHA. A work stoppage under section 502 must be supported by
"ascertainable, objective evidence." See Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers,
414 U.S. 368, 387 (1974).
38. See National Labor Relations Act § 7 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988)).
Section 7 grants employees the right to engage in concerted activities for the purpose
of mutual aid or protection. An employer discharging or disciplining employees en-
gaged in protected concerted refusal to work because of unsafe conditions violates
section 8(a)(1) of the Act. An employee covered by a collective bargaining agreement
will be accorded section 7 protection if the employee's refusal to perform a work as-
signment is "based on a reasonable and honest belief' that she has been asked to
perform a task not required under the contract. In contradistinction to OSHA and
section 502 of the NLRA, section 7 requires a subjective standard of proof or a sub-
jective standard of reasonableness, i.e., a good faith belief. However, under a collec-
tive bargaining agreement, the employee's refusal to work may be concerted but un-
protected if, for example, the contract includes specific methods for protesting unsafe
work conditions or has a no-strike provision. See NLRB v. Washington Aluminum
Co., 370 U.S. 9, 16-17 (1962); NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., 465 U.S. 822, 837 (1984).
The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) in defining concerted activity makes
an important distinction between employees covered under a collective bargaining
agreement and those who are not. Where there is no collective bargaining contract, an
employee refusing a work assignment must show support of his actions by fellow em-
ployees. In other words, the refusal must be "engaged in with or on the authority of
other employees, and not solely by and on behalf of the employee himself." Meyers
Indus. Inc. (Meyers II), 281 N.L.RB. 882, 885 (1986) (quoting Meyers I, 268
N.L.R.B. 493, 497 (1984)), aff'd sub nom. Prill v. N.L.R.B., 835 F.2d 1481 (D.C. Cir.
1987). A good faith belief about the risk of AIDS contagion cannot protect the refus-
ing employee acting alone. See Prill v. NLRB, 835 F.2d at 1483-84.




plied to employees who refuse assignments because of fear of AIDS
contagion, (3) assesses whether the standards are realistic and allow
arbitrators to fairly balance the conflicting interests of the employer
and the refusing employee, (4) concludes that the standards applied
are not realistic, and (5) offers a more realistic standard for arbitra-
tion of cases involving employees who refuse work assignments with
AIDS victims because of fear of contagion.
II. REFUSAL TO PERFORM WORK ASSIGNMENTS: WHETHER JUST
CAUSE FOR DISCIPLINE OR DISCHARGE?
A. Just Cause: Introducing the Standard
Forty-eight years ago, arbitrator Harry Shulman decided the well-
known Ford Motor Co.4 0 case that set forth the guiding principle
uniformly followed in refusal-to-work grievances. In that case, the
employer discharged the union committeeman for instructing pro-
duction employees to refuse to accept temporary assignments to
higher job classifications. During the hearing, company and union
witnesses agreed that it had been a long established policy that em-
ployees could temporarily be assigned to work in lower classifica-
tions but not higher job classifications. The union contended that
the discharge was without just cause since the employer's assign-
ments to the higher classifications violated the collective bargaining
agreement. Shulman firmly disagreed that the violation of the col-
lective bargaining agreement gave reason to disobey the employer's
instructions and stated the famous "work first, grieve later"
principle:
Some men apparently think that, when a violation of contract
seems clear, the employee may refuse to obey and thus resort to
self-help rather than the grievance procedure. That is an erroneous
point of view. In the first place, what appears to one party to be a
clear violation may not seem so at all to the other party. . . . But,
in the second place, and more important, the grievance procedure
is prescribed in the contract precisely because the parties antici-
pated that there would be claims of violations which would require
adjustment."'
The necessity for what appeared to be a harsh principle for em-
ployees to live by in the workplace was explained by Shulman:
[A]n industrial plant is not a debating society. Its object is produc-
tion. When a controversy arises, production cannot wait for ex-
haustion of grievance procedure. While that procedure is being
pursued, production must go on. And someone must have the au-
thority to direct the manner in which it is to go on until the contro-
versy is settled. That authority is vested in supervision. .... It is
40. Ford Motor Co., 3 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 779 (1944) (Shulman, Arb.).
41. Id. at 780-81.
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fairly vested there because the grievance procedure is capable of
adequately recompensing employees for abuse of authority by
supervision.' 2
Almost five decades later, arbitrators continue to apply the work
first, grieve later principle while quoting the well-recognized and ac-
cepted language previously cited. Shulman did provide an exception
to the work first, grieve later principle which would only apply "in
the rare case where obedience would involve an unusual health haz-
ard or similar sacrifice.' ' This exception has become the decisive
factor in refusal-to-work grievances when health and safety of the
employee are offered as justification for the refusal. Over the years
the exception has become a kaleidoscope of nuances through its ap-
plication to the sundry fact patterns presented in employees'
grievances.
B. The Employer's Burden: Proving Just Cause
An employee who has been disciplined or discharged for refusing a
work assignment may ask her union to pursue the grievance through
arbitration if the collective bargaining agreement so permits."" Man-
agement's charge against the employee which precipitates the griev-
ance is insubordination. Generally the issue before the arbitrator is:
Whether the employer had just cause to discipline (e.g., suspend) or
discharge the grievant, and, if not, what is the appropriate remedy?
The mechanics of proof in arbitrating discipline and discharge
cases (which include refusal to obey a work order) have a unique
operation. Even though the grievant in actuality is the complaining
party, the burden of proving just cause is placed on the employer.4
Provisions of the bargaining agreement must be proffered by the
employer to show (1) management's authority to effectuate the dis-
42. Id. at 781.
43. Id. at 782.
44. Prior to arbitration, the aggrieved employee must exhaust informal grievance
procedure steps specified in the collective bargaining agreement. Arbitration is the
final and formal step of the process which, unlike the informal procedure, surrenders
resolution of the dispute to an outsider or third party, i.e., the arbitrator. An arbitra-
tion provision that can trigger this dispute resolution process might read:
Should the Employer and the Union fail to arrive at a satisfactory adjust-
ment of the grievance, the matter shall then be referred to arbitration
within ten (10) days. The Employer and/or the Union shall file a request to
the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS) or American Arbi-
tration Association (AAA) to appoint an Arbitrator. The decision of the Ar-
bitrator shall be final and binding upon the Union and the Employer. The
expenses incident to the services of the Arbitrator shall be borne equally by
the Employer and the Union.
45. The burden of proof weighs heavily upon the employer who, through retained
contractual rights to discharge or discipline, can impose economic punishment on the




cipline or discharge4 6 and (2) the employee's conduct which war-
ranted the discipline or discharge.4 7
Just cause under the collective bargaining agreement restricts
management's power to discipline.4 8 The just cause standard has
been described as a "rule of reasonableness" which safeguards work-
ers from disciplinary action that is unjust, arbitrary, capricious or
lacks some reasonable foundation for its support.4 9 Even where the
collective bargaining agreement is devoid of specific just cause lan-
guage, the arbitrator will find, absent a clear proviso to the contrary,
46. Generally the employer will rely on management rights and discipline and dis-
charge provisions in the collective bargaining agreement along with relevant plant
rules as the authority for the action taken against the employee. An example of such
provisions and rules follows:
MANAGEMENT RIGHTS
Subject to the provisions of this Agreement the Union recognizes that the
management of the plant and the direction of the working force are vested
exclusively in the Employer, which includes, but is not limited to, the right
to hire, demote, promote, suspend or discharge for just cause.
DISCIPLINE
For purposes of this Agreement, disciplinary action shall be defined as oral
admonishment, written reprimands, suspensions, and removals.
Discipline is the responsibility and the right of the Employer, and it agrees
that such actions shall be based on just cause and in accordance with appli-
cable regulation.
The discipline provision would then set forth the procedures that must be adhered to
by the employer when imposing the disciplinary action (e.g., notice within a specified
time of the offense charged, investigation of the offense, and allowing the employee
opportunity to respond to the charge).
GENERAL PLANT RULES
Any employee who violates any of the General Company Rules may be sus-
pended or discharged, either after a warning, or immediately, without a
warning.
INSUBORDINATION
Insubordination is defined as refusal or willful failure to satisfactorily per-
form a reasonable task or duty or to obey instructions as assigned or di-
rected by a supervisor.
47. Some collective bargaining agreements set forth the type of actions employees
may take in refusing a work assignment. An employee who does not comply with such
a provision will be found to have per se violated the contract. See, e.g., the collective
bargaining agreement analyzed in Jefferson City Cabinet Co., 50 Lab. Arb. Rep.
(BNA) 213, 215-16 (1968) (Williams, Arb.): "Article XIII, Section 10, of the Agree-
ment, provides as follows: 'If any employee or group of employees feels that any order
of a supervisor is unreasonable or unjust, the employee or group of employees af-
fected will comply but may if they choose institute a grievance over the matter.'"
However, other contract provisions may bear on such a provision when safety and
health issues are involved.
48. See, e.g., the management rights and discipline provisions supra note 46.
49. Department of the Air Force, 1990 BNA Unp. Lab. Arb. LEXIS 1267, at *13
(Neas and Tharp, Arbs.), available in LEXIS, BNA library, ALLLA file. [Hereinafter
all cites to LEXIS refer to the BNA library, ALLLA file.] See also Department of
Correctional Servs., 92 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1059, 1060 n.1 (1989) (Babiskin, Arb.).
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that the just cause standard is implied in the contract 80
In Grief Bros. Cooperage Corp.,81 Arbitrator Carroll Daugherty
devised a seven-part test for determining whether an employer had
just and sufficient cause for disciplining an employee. Daugherty de-
scribed his test, or seven criteria, as a sort of "common law" of just
cause that arbitrators have developed over the years. When the
seven criteria are applied to the facts of a case, a "no" answer to any
one or more of the criteria normally signifies that just and proper
cause did not exist. Daugherty explains: "'[N]o' means that the em-
ployer's disciplinary decision contained one or more elements of ar-
bitrary, capricious, unreasonable, and/or discriminatory action to
such an extent that said decision constituted an abuse of managerial
discretion warranting the arbitrator to substitute his judgment.""2
Arbitrator Daugherty's seven criteria for finding just cause are:
1. Whether the employer forewarned the employee of the possible
or probable disciplinary consequences of his conduct. 3
2. Whether the rule or order violated was reasonably related to
the efficient and safe operation of the employer's business."
3. Whether the employer, before disciplining the employee, at-
tempted to discover whether the employee did in fact violate or dis-
obey a rule or order of management.8
4. Whether the employer's investigation was fair and objective.
5. Whether the evidence against the employee was substantial.
6. Whether the employer applied its rule, orders, and penalties
even-handedly. 56
50. See City of West Frankfort, 1990 BNA Unp. Lab. Arb. LEXIS 1292, at "6
(Reilly, Arb.); Formitex, Inc., 1988 BNA Unp. Lab. Arb. LEXIS 3841, at *11
(Imundo, Arb.).
51. 42 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 555 (1964) (Daugherty, Arb.).
52. Id. at 557. The American Arbitration Association (AAA) has accepted Daugh-
erty's criteria as a guideline for determining just cause in discipline cases. See Indian-
apolis Rubber Co., 79 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 529, 534 (1982) (Gibson, Arb.).
53. The employee must have received actual oral or written communication that
failure to obey a work order is insubordination and can result in some type of disci-
plinary action (e.g., suspension or discharge). Grief Cooperage Corp., 42 Lab. Arb.
Rep. (BNA) 555, 558 (1964) (Daugherty, Arb.).
54. The Shulman principle and exception are absorbed in criterion two. Arbitra-
tor Daugherty has commented on this criterion:
If an employee believes that [the] said rule or order is unreasonable, he
must nevertheless obey same (in which case he may file a grievance there-
over) unless he sincerely feels that to obey the rule or order would seriously
and immediately jeopardize his personal safety and/or integrity. Given a
firm finding to the latter effect, the employee may properly be said to have
had justification for his disobedience.
Id.
55. Arbitrator Daugherty instructs that the investigation must normally be made
before the employer's disciplinary decision is made. Id.
56. Daugherty states that a "no" answer to this criterion would warrant negation
or modification of the discipline imposed. Id.
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7. Whether the degree of discipline was reasonably related to the
seriousness of the employee's proven offense and the employee's
prior employment record.57
Even though there is general agreement on the just cause stan-
dard, arbitrators do not agree on the quantum of proof required to
prove just cause. Arbitrators' evidentiary weighting scales range
from "a preponderance" at one end to "beyond a reasonable doubt"
at the other. 8 Even so, arbitrators are uniformly guided by the na-
ture of the employee's offense in determining the requisite quantum
of proof.59 Most often, arbitrators require the employer to prove just
57. Id. at 557-59. While many arbitrators apply the Daugherty criteria, some will
state a different test or standard. Even so, Daugherty's broad seven-part test can
accommodate most of those standards. See, e.g., Fruehauf Trailer Co., 16 Lab. Arb.
Rep. (BNA) 666, 670 (1951) (Spaulding, Arb.) (quoted in Olin Corp., 90 Lab. Arb.
Rep. (BNA) 1206, 1213 (1988) (Fitz-Simmons, Arb.)) ("an arbitrator will not lightly
upset a decision reached by competent careful management which acts in the full
light of all the facts, and without any evidence of bias, haste or lack of emotional
balance."). City of Los Angeles, 1988 BNA Unp. Lab. Arb. LEXIS 2982 (Hoh, Arb.),
declared that the function of the arbitrator in just cause discipline cases is:
not only to determine whether the employee is guilty of wrong-doing ...
but also to protect the interests of the employee by assuring that the causes
for the imposition of discipline were just and equitable under all of the
factual circumstances. . . . At minimum, arbitrators may examine the em-
ployer's actions to determine whether they were arbitrary, capricious, or
characterized by an abuse of discretion.
Id. at *4. Arbitrator Harry Platt, as evidenced in the much-cited case of Riley Stoker
Corp., 7 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 764, 767 (1941) (Platt, Arb.), would also safeguard the
interests of the discharged employee, but would assess whether the discharge was just
and equitable by what
[a] reasonable man, mindful of the habits and customs of industrial life and
of the standards of justice and fair dealing prevalent in the community,
ought to have done under similar circumstances and in that light to decide
whether the conduct of the discharged employee was defensible and the
disciplinary penalty just.
Recent cases are in agreement with Arbitrator Platt's approach. See, e.g., Lakeside
Jubilee Foods, 95 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 358 (1990) (Berquist, Arb.); H.J. Heinz Co.,
95 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 82 (1990) (Ellmann, Arb.) (citing Platt's standard but ap-
plying Daugherty's test).
58. Super-Valu Stores, Inc., 74 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 939, 942 (1980) (Evenson,
Arb.).
59. Offenses are of two general classes: (1) those which are extremely serious (such
as stealing, striking a foreman, or persistent refusal to obey a legitimate order) and
call for harsh penalties, and (2) those less serious infractions of plant rules or proper
conduct (such as tardiness, absence without permission, careless workmanship, inso-
lence) which do not call for discharge for the first offense (and may not, under the
contract, for the second or third offense) but for some milder penalty aimed at correc-
tion. See Department of the Air Force, 1990 Unp. Lab. Arb. LEXIS 1267, at *20
(Neas and Tharp, Arbs.). Arbitral decisions determining the requisite quantum of
proof are generally in accord that discharge for criminal actions, morally reprehensi-
ble conduct, or conduct involving moral turpitude should be subjected to the more
stringent "beyond a reasonable doubt" criterion. This approach is taken "since the
effect of the discharge for any of these reasons often has a far-reaching and lingering
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cause by a preponderance of the evidence in refusal-to-obey cases
where the employee relies on the Shulman exception."0 Arbitrators
view the term preponderance of the evidence as synonymous with
"greater weight of evidence" or "the more valuable and persuasive
force of the aggregate evidence on both sides." Because arbitrators
frequently must decide between conflicting testimony, preponder-
ance of evidence has also been described as "the more credible or
probable evidence .... [which] overcome[s] opposing presumptions
and evidence."6
Applying the preponderance of evidence rule to the evidence
presented by the employer, the arbitrator can evaluate, using
Daugherty's seven criteria as a guide, whether the employer has es-
tablished a prima facie case against the grievant. If the employer
makes out a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the union repre-
senting the grievant to produce evidence in rebuttal. In a refusal to
obey a work assignment case, the union should present evidence
showing (1) that the employer's conduct did not meet the Daugherty
criteria and (2) that the grievant comes within Shulman's exception.
C. The Employee's Burden: Proving the Shulman Exception
When a grievant testifies she refused a work assignment because
of safety or health hazards, the Shulman exception is introduced
into the case along with some burden of proof problems. The ques-
tion the arbitrator must resolve is which standard of proof should be
required for the grievant to show that she comes within the excep-
tion. Arbitral standard of proof requirements have ranged from a
subjective standard, i.e., whether the employee honestly believed
there was a health hazard;"2 to a reasonable person standard, i.e.,
effect on the life of the grievant far beyond the loss of his job ...." Super-Valu
Stores, Inc., 74 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 939, 942 (1980) (Evenson, Arb.). Outside the
criminal area a lesser degree of proof is required. See, e.g., Department of the Air
Force, 1990 BNA Unp. Lab. Arb. LEXIS 1267, at "19 (Neas and Tharp. Arbs.), where
the grievant was given a ten-day suspension for a two.day unauthorized absence. The
arbitrator held that "beyond a reasonable doubt" was an inappropriate standard in a
minor discipline case. Cf. Olin Corp., 90 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1206, 1212 (1988)
(Fitzsimmons, Arb.), where the grievant was terminated for violating a plant rule
against fighting or inciting a fight. The arbitrator held that the proof standard was
"clear and convincing" since the alleged misconduct also carried a stigma of social
disapproval.
60. See, e.g., T & J Indus., Inc., 79 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 697, 700 (1982) (Clark.
Arb.) ("[Ilt is the weight of authority that the Company has the burden of persua-
sively demonstrating by a preponderance of credible evidence that the . .dis.
charge] is warranted.").
61. Department of the Air Force, 1990 BNA Unp. Lab. Arb. LEXIS 1267, at * 19
(Neas and Tharp, Arbs.). This opinion offers a helpful summary discussion on the
mechanics of burden of proof in discipline cases. See id. at *18-19.
62. See, e.g., West Penn Power Co., 89 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1227, 1231 (1987)
(Hogler, Arb.): "[E]mployees who refuse to perform unsafe work are [not] guilty of
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whether the employee held a reasonable belief about the danger; 3 to
an objective standard requiring the showing of actual danger, i.e.,
whether there was in fact danger or imminent hazard to life and
limb." ' The majority of arbitrators take the middle approach, apply-
ing the reasonable person standard.6
5
insubordination ... if the employee acts out of a sincere and genuine belief that the
work is unreasonably and abnormally dangerous and presents a threat of imminent
bodily harm ...."
63. See, e.g., Laclede Gas Co., 39 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 833, 839 (1962) (Bothwell,
Arb.):
[Aln employee may refuse to carry out a particular work assignment, if at
the time he is given the work assignment, he reasonably believes that by
carrying out such work assignment he will endanger his safety or health.
... [T]he employee ... also has the burden, if called upon, of showing by
appropriate evidence that he had a reasonable basis for his belief.
For recent cases following this approach, see, e.g., Lancaster Electro Plating, Inc., 93
Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 203 (1989) (Bressler, Arb.); Entenmann's Bakery of Fla., Inc.,
77 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1080 (1981) (Ness, Arb.).
64. See, e.g., City of Aurora, 1988 BNA Unp. Lab. Arb. LEXIS 3857, at '10 (Hill,
Arb.) ("Some arbitrators take the position that despite the good-faith belief of the
grievant concerning the safety hazard if, in fact, no hazard exists he has acted insub-
ordinately.") (citing Griffin Pipe Products Co., 72 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1033, 1035
(1979) (Doyle, Arb.); Hercules Inc., 48 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 788, 793 (1967) (Hop-
son, Arb.); 3M Company, 80 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 926, 927 (1983) (Gallagher, Arb.)).
65. In their determination of which proof standard to apply, arbitrators selecting
the reasonable person standard have noted that their decision was in conformity with
those of the majority of arbitrators. See, e.g., Leland Oil Mill, 91 Lab. Arb. Rop.
(BNA) 905, 907 n.2 (1988) (Nicholas, Arb.) (citing Arbitrator Bothwell as summariz-
ing the prevailing view in setting forth his reasonableness standard in Laclede Gas
Co., 39 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 833 (1962), supra note 63; Northern Automatic Elec.
Foundry, 90 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 620, 623 (1987) (Poindexter, Arb.) (citing FRANK
ELKOURI & EDNA A. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKs 713 (4th ed. 1985)); Indian-
apolis Power & Light Co., 87 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 559, 562 (1986) (Kates, Arb.).
But see James A. Gross & Patricia A. Greenfield, Arbitral Value Judgments in
Health and Safety Disputes: Management Rights Over Workers' Rights, 34 BUFF L
REv 645 (1985), which found that forty-two percent of the arbitrators in the 120
refusal-to-work cases the authors reviewed (743 cases were actually examined for the
article) used the objective standard. Id. at 650-51. In only twenty-five percent of the
cases did the arbitrators apply the reasonable person standard. Id. at 653-54. The
forty-two percent figure offered support for the article's premise that arbitral value
judgments establish the standards of proof and presumptions that shape arbitrators'
conceptions of health and safety cases by focusing on management rights rather than
workers' rights. Therefore, arbitrators' selection of the objective standard served to
place a heavier proof burden on the employee, which in turn helped to maximize an
employer's control of employee discipline and, thereby, minimize employee interfer-
ence with management's freedom to operate the enterprise. However, this Author's
research found that the majority of arbitrators apply a reasonableness standard in
safety and health cases. What may explain the different results, which this Author
thinks important, is that the Gross and Greenfield case study extends from 1945 to
1984. In contrast, this Author specifically focused her case review from 1979 to 1990.
Within the almost 40-year span of the Gross and Greenfield study, America's labor-
management relations underwent significant changes with the promulgation of labor
legislation that focused on balancing the rights of employee and employer, which in
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Once the question of what proof standard to apply is settled, the
next step of the grievance case, the operation of the exception, be-
comes more complicated. Shulman's broadly stated exception-that
a refusal is proper in those rare cases where obedience would involve
an unusual health hazard-has been laden with qualifications. A dis-
cussion of how arbitrators apply the exception follows. But remem-
ber, the exception operates within the orbit of the predetermined
arbitral standard of proof.
An employee who invokes the exception must state, at the time of
her refusal, first, that she believes or fears there is a risk to her
safety or health"6 or the safety or health of others if the assignment
is performed " and second, her reason for believing that such a risk
exists.' However, arbitrators have on occasion sustained a grievance
even though the employee failed to state or articulate clearly her
belief of danger where the employer is aware that circumstances
could produce such safety hazard. Arbitrator Grupp took this ap-
proach in Tanner Division of New Castle Industries,"" when he
ruled in favor of two grievants who refused an order to clean their
work area while machines they operated were still running. At the
time they declined to clean up, grievants only asked who would bear
the responsibility for any damage to stock if the machine malfunc-
tioned because the operators were not available to adjust or shut the
turn may have had some influence on arbitral values. See Madelyn C. Squire, The
Prima Facie Tort Doctrine and a Social Justice Theory: Are They a Response to the
Employment At-Will Rule?, 51 U. Prrr. L REv 641, 653-54 (1990) (noting that the
second quarter of the twentieth century ushered in a change in the unfavorable atti-
tude of the law toward labor with the passage and judicial approval of protective
labor legislation). However, the Gross and Greenfield article is informative and inter-
esting reading on their subject.
66. See, e.g., Peabody Coal Co., 87 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1002, 1007 (1986) (Volz.
Arb.) (holding that the mere statement by an employee that he was exercising his
contractual "safety rights" without mention of specific physical conditions he be-
lieved to be unusually dangerous was insufficient).
67. See Dauphin County Prison Bd., 1989 BNA Unp. Lab. Arb. LEXIS 2982, at
*12 (Mayer, Arb.) (The exception "appl[ies] as well where the employee asserts that
if he were to obey the order the safety or health of others would be in dire jeop-
ardy."). See also Phoenix Transit Sys., 1990 BNA Unp. Lab. Arb. LEXIS 1241 (Wy-
man, Arb.). This opinion discussed a grievant bus driver's refusal to follow a transit
system's signaling policy because of his belief that use of the prescribed signaling
would put passengers and the motoring public at risk. Arbitrator Wyman, though
denying the grievance, found that extending the Shulman exception to the passengers
was contractually correct.
68. See City of Aurora, 1988 BNA Unp. Lab. Arb. LEXIS 3857, at °10-11 (Hill,
Arb.) ("[A]n employee may [not] claim that any task is dangerous and, on this basis
alone, safely ignore [the employer's] instructions. The circumstances must appear to
furnish a reasonable basis for the claimed apprehension. ... ). See also Leland Oil
Mill, 91 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 905, 907 (1988) (Nicholas, Arb.) (citing Laclede Gas
Co., 39 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 833, 839 (1962) (Bothwell, Arb.)); Northern Automatic
Elec. Foundry, 90 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 620, 625 (1987) (Poindexter, Arb.).
69. 1989 BNA Unp. Lab. Arb. LEXIS 4834 (Grupp, Arb.).
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machines down. Even though there appeared to be no expressed
concern for personal safety, the arbitrator noted that the grievants
were not responding to beginners in the machine shop business-the
supervisors knew the danger of leaving a machine unattended. In
fact, a similar incident had occurred years earlier where an unat-
tended machine did malfunction and forcefully threw materials in
the air of the shop.70
The primary, but troublesome, qualification for operation of the
exception was stated by Shulman, namely, obedience to the order
must subject the employee to an "unusual" health hazard or "simi-
lar" sacrifice. Unusual is used in the sense that the perceived danger
is beyond the risk inherent in the employee's job, as in Peoples Nat-
ural Gas Co. 7 1 In that case grievants, members of a line crew used to
working outside in various weather conditions, refused to install
pipeline along a public road because of snow conditions.7 2 The arbi-
trator found persuasive evidence submitted by the union that the
location where the crew was to install the line-a two-lane, sloping
public road which the grievants had to cross with long sections of
pipe weighing 80 to 100 pounds each-in conjunction with driving
snow and rain gave reasonable grounds for grievants to believe they
were being asked to work under abnormally dangerous conditions.
An extremely dangerous work assignment does not ipso facto
bring the grievant within the exception. United States Pipe &
Foundry Co.7 3 is a case in point. The foundry's ten-ton ladle car,
which poured molten iron into smaller transfer ladles, would not
move. This created an emergency because the iron, if not poured,
could quickly solidify. Grievant, the company's "electrical trouble-
shooter," was instructed by the supervisor to "enter the hole and
repair the ladle car." Grievant asked if iron would be poured from
the ten-ton ladle while he worked below. He was told the pouring
operation would continue, and Grievant refused to enter the hole.
The arbitrator upheld grievant's suspension. The arbitrator found
working around molten iron was an inherent characteristic of foun-
dry work and the precautions taken by the company were safe in
terms of a typical foundry operation.74
Understanding the operation of Shulman's exception can become
a challenge. Variegated facts presented on the issue of whether the
danger was "unusual" have created an analytical mire. City of Los
70. Id. at *5.
71. 1988 BNA Unp. Lab. Arb. LEXIS 3925 (Sherman, Arb.).
72. Their collective bargaining agreement stated that "when practicable, employ-
ees may not be required to work out of doors in severe weather conditions," and
required that suspension or discharge be for just cause. The arbitrator applied Shul-
man's exception in conjunction with the reasonable person standard to interpret cru-
cial contract terms of "severe" and "just cause." Id. at *4-7.
73. 84 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 770 (1985) (Singer, Arb.).
74. Id. at 776.
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Angeles75 is illustrative. Grievant, a refuse truck operator, would not
drive one of the older White trucks because it would overheat and
burn the legs of the operator. The overheating problem did not exist
with the newer Peterbilt refuse trucks. The arbitrator found there
was nothing "unusual or abnormal" about the safety of the White
truck because the overheating-burning problem existed uniformly in
all of the White trucks. Nor did the arbitrator find an unusual haz-
ard in Dauphin County Prison Board7 6 when a prison guard refused
to wear a "community coat" to patrol the outside grounds out of
fear he could take lice home to his pregnant wife. Evidence disclosed
employees routinely took showers with a chemical solution for lice
and on occasion entire cell blocks had to be deloused. The arbitrator
found that exposure to lice, crabs, and scabies was very much inher-
ent in a correctional officer's job.
On the other hand, arbitrators have allowed the exception even
though the order directed the grievant to engage in conduct that did
not present an unusual or abnormal risk when performed by other
employees but would present an unusual safety or health hazard
when performed by the grievant. Such a situation can occur where
the lack of experience or training of the grievant makes performance
of the assigned job unduly hazardous.' Another situation is where
the health or physical condition of the grievant makes an otherwise
not inherently dangerous job abnormally hazardous if performed by
the grievant. For example, in MacDill Air Force Base" , the grievant
refused to comply with an order to wear steel toe boots designed to
protect employees assigned to the carpenter shop from injuries. The
arbitrator concluded that wearing the boots would result in "undue
exposure to a health hazard" because grievant was a diabetic, and
the boots could cause serious damage to grievant's feet. Similarly, in
Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp.,80 Arbitrator Corbett held the
exception applied where grievant's illness, which was the basis of the
refusal, made her unsafe to perform the assigned overtime work and
thereby made the inherent risk of the job unreasonable.
Grievants invoking the Shulman exception should be warned: if
alternative conduct was available to the employee the exception will
not apply. This caveat was aptly expressed by Arbitrator Mayer,
who wrote that "the burden falls upon the [grievant] to conclusively
show that the imminent danger and/or health hazard was so compel-
ling and opportunities for their correction so hopeless as to require
75. 1988 BNA Unp. Lab. Arb. LEXIS 2982 (Hoh, Arb.).
76. 1989 BNA Unp. Lab. Arb. LEXIS 2982 (Mayer, Arb.).
77. Id. at *12.
78. See Hayes-Albion Corp., 73 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 819 (1979) (Foster. Arb.).
79. 1988 BNA Unp. Lab. Arb. LEXIS 4624 (Remington, Arb.).
80. 92 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 367 (1989) (Corbett, Arb.).
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nothing less than a flat refusal to obey a [legitimate] order ....
Once a grievant's evidence has established that there was an un-
usual or abnormal health and safety hazard which subjected life or
limb to risk, an employer, on rebuttal, might show that another em-
ployee or a supervisor performed the ordered work without injury.
Such proffered evidence by the employer is uniformly rejected by
arbitrators, who observe that the employee is "not obligated to at-
tempt to perform the work assignment in order to see what would
happen.""2 The question arbitrators are concerned with is not
whether the grievant would have suffered injury from an abnormal
hazard, but whether the grievant had a justifiable basis for believing
so.s 3 The question of the adequacy of the justification is to be judged
by the facts or conditions existing at the time of grievant's refusal to
obey. What the employer must show is that the conditions existing
at that time constituted only remote and contingent possibilities of
danger to health and safety."4
However, arbitrators must cautiously sift through the facts to dis-
tinguish "between situations that bring on discomfort and displea-
sure and those that pose as a significant threat to [the employee's]
health and safety."85 Northern Automatic Electric Foundry"'
81. Dauphine County Prison Bd., 1989 BNA Unp. Lab. Arb. LEXIS 2982, at *12
(Mayer, Arb.). See also Iowa Power and Light Co., 76 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 482, 486
(1981) (Gradwohl, Arb.), in which grievant was suspended for refusing to drive a
truck he alleged had defective brakes. The suspension was upheld because the arbi-
trator found that there were "several reasonable alternatives ... [grievant] was obli-
gated to pursue .... " Grievant, prior to the suspending event, could have submitted
a repair ticket on the vehicle or taken the truck himself to the repair garage. Id.
82. Laclede Gas Co., 39 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 833, 841 (1962) (Bothwell, Arb.).
83. See City of West Frankfort, 1990 BNA Unp. Lab. Arb. LEXIS 1292 (Reilly,
Arb.); MacDill Air Force Base, 1988 BNA Unp. Lab. Arb. LEXIS 4624 (Remington,
Arb.); Peoples Natural Gas Co., 1988 BNA Unp. Lab. Arb. LEXIS 3925 (Sherman,
Arb.); Entenmann's Bakery of Fla., Inc., 77 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1080, 1084 (1981)
(Ness, Arb.).
84. See, e.g., IMC Fertilizer, 1990 BNA Unp. Lab. Arb. LEXIS 2653 (Mathews,
Arb.). In this matter, the grievant refused to install the NEMA-1 junction box which
connected the plant's electrical motors and lines. The NEMA-1 was not guaranteed
watertight and was to be installed in an area where there was an extreme amount of
water. As such, the grievant believed the box would endanger other workers. The
arbitrator accepted the company's evidence, which showed that only upon the simul-
taneous occurrence of at least three unlikely contingent events could there be even a
remote or theoretical possibility of an electrical hazard. See also Fulton Seafood In-
dus., Inc., 74 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 620, 623 (1980) (Volz, Arb.) ("a reasonable basis
for a fear of safety ... must be predicated upon ... [existing] facts and not upon a
past experience under different conditions . . ").
85. Leland Oil Mill, 91 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 905, 908 (1988) (Nicholas, Arb.).
See also Allied Health Care Products, 94 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 178, 183 (1990) (Ci-
polla, Arb.) (quoting Chicago Transit Auth., 80 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 13,19, 1352
(1983) (Cox, Arb.) ("Employee discomfort is not a safety or health threat which re-
quires an alternate assignment [where the contract allows].")).
86. 90 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 620 (1987) (Poindexter, Arb.).
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presented this problem to Arbitrator Poindexter. Grievant's work
assignment required him to lift two 100-pound bags of material to a
height of four to five feet above the ground onto a cement-type
mixer, break the bag open, put it into the mixer, dump the mixer,
shovel the mixture and then start the process over. Grievant con-
tended that he walked off the job because the pace expected could
not be maintained by a man of his age. The arbitrator denied the
grievance, finding that the "assignment may have been hard" but
did not, after only twelve minutes of work by the grievant, rise to
the level of being unsafe."'
In cases where no unusual or abnormal health hazard is estab-
lished, a grievant cannot fashion a safety net by showing that at the
time of refusal she offered to perform another job. Arbitrators have
consistently held that such an offer does not obviate the grievant's
responsibility to perform the assigned job.8
Shulman's exception has rescued employees engaged in a con-
certed refusal to work when a no-strike clause had been included in
their collective bargaining agreement. Such employees are not in vi-
olation of the bargaining contract if they act out of a justifiable be-
lief that the work assigned is abnormally dangerous.8 ' Additionally,
arbitrators deciding group refusal cases have accepted guidance
from the Labor Management Relations Act, and have even recog-
nized or accorded notice to section 7 of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, which grants employees the right to engage in concerted
activities for the purpose of mutual aid or protection."
87. Id. at 624. The arbitrator also pointed to facts showing that the grievant left
after help had arrived, other employees performed the work without safety com-
plaints, and the work was similar to the grievant's normal duties.
88. See Amoco Oil Co., 87 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 889. 893 (1986) (Schwartz. Arb.).
The grievant, even with safety equipment, refused to perform regular duties in an
area where asbestos was being removed from plant pipes. The grievant stated that he
was concerned about the health risk and requested that his supervisor assign him to
another job. His discharge was upheld by the arbitrator.
89. The evidentiary standard applied may require less proof than section 502 of
the LMRA. See, e.g., West Penn Power Co., 89 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1227 (1987)
(Hogler, Arb.), where the bargaining contract accorded the company an "unqualified
right to discipline or discharge employees participating in or encouraging" any strike.
slowdown, or refusal to carry out work assignments. Even though Arbitrator Hogler
found that the evidence did not establish a concerted refusal, he asserted:
[A]ssuming that the line crew had acted by mutual accord in this case, the
safety issue remains as an alternate ground of decision. It is a recognized
arbitral principle that employees who refuse to perform unsafe work are
neither guilty of insubordination nor deemed to be strikers. As a general
rule, if the employee acts out of a sincere and genuine belief that the work
is unreasonably and abnormally dangerous and presents a threat of immi-
nent bodily harm, his conduct is protected against discipline.
Id. at 1231 (emphasis supplied). See supra note 37 and accompanying text for discus-
sion of section 502.
90. See Tanner Div. of New Castle Indus., Inc., 1989 BNA Unp. Lab. Arb. LEXIS
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Moreover, arbitrators have also accorded recognition to the Occu-
pational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) and findings of the agency
administering that Act. Principles underlying the Act are noted by
arbitrators as further support for applying the Shulman exception.
OSHA investigative reports or findings on safety conditions at the
employer's business can be admitted in arbitration cases. The find-
ings are allowed as additional evidence on whether there was an ab-
normally dangerous risk."'
As illustrated, operation of the Shulman exception can be a chal-
lenge and result in defeat for the uninformed.
D. Daugherty's Criteria: Application in Safety and Health
Grievances
Even though a grievant's evidence may fail to establish her enti-
tlement to Shulman's exception, her evidence may establish lack of
just cause under Daugherty's seven criteria. Three of the criteria ap-
pear to be raised more frequently than others in conjunction with
the safety and health hazard defense: (1) absence or insufficiency of
forewarning of possible consequences of disobeying a work order, (2)
absence or insufficiency of the employer's investigation into the
grievant's allegation of an abnormal work hazard, and (3) the disci-
pline or discharge was excessive in relation to the seriousness of the
offense. Arbitrator Daugherty states that a "no" answer to one or
more of his criteria normally signifies that just cause did not exist.2
Daugherty's guideline regarding forewarning of possible conse-
quences has been interpreted by arbitrators as requiring: (1) that
very clear and direct instructions be given by the supervisor to the
employee and (2) even more explicit warning be given to the em-
ployee of the consequences of disobeying the instructions." The
function of the direct order is to impress upon the employee the
seriousness of her conduct and to give her a final opportunity to
obey before disciplinary consequences attach. The direct order su-
persedes any prior orders relating to the same matter. Typically, a
failure to respond to such prior order is overlooked should the direct
4834, at *5-6 (Grubb, Arb.) (worker's action was concerted activity protected under §
7 and employees can refuse to comply with orders which would reasonably be inimical
to health and safety pursuant to LMRA § 502); Welco Mfg. Co., 80 Lab. Arb. Rep.
(BNA) 273, 275 (1983) (Yarowsky, Arb.) (§ 7 protects concerted refusal-to-work
protests).
91. See, e.g., United States Pipe and Foundry Co., 84 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 770,
776 (1985) (Singer, Arb.); Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 79 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 587,
589-90 (1982) (McCollister, Arb.); Hayes-Albion Corp., 73 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 819,
822 (1979) (Foster, Arb.).
92. See supra text accompanying notes 51-57.
93. See T & J Indus., Inc., 79 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 697, 701 (1982) (Clark, Arb.)
(citing Micro Precision Gear & Mach. Corp., 31 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 575, 579-80
(1958) (Young, Arb.)).
[Vol. 44:315
AIDS IN THE WORKPLACE
order be properly obeyed. However, disobedience of the direct order
constitutes an aggravating circumstance in assessing the penalty."
This guideline comes into issue in safety and health hazard cases
because the supervisor's response to the refusal is often ambiguous.
Grievants have testified that supervisors stated to them, "There is
no other work available," or "Go home," without explanation.,
Such statements are ambiguous. For example, did the -supervisor
mean that there was no substitute work for the grievant, or did she
mean that disciplinary action was being imposed on the grievant at
that time?
Daugherty's criteria also place an obligation on the employer to
investigate the safety or health hazard complained of, and, if reason-
ably possible, to remove the hazard by appropriate measures before
requiring performance. The employer's failure to investigate the
hazard has, at times, been the crucial factor in sustaining a griev-
ance. 6 This was the outcome in Jacksonville Shipyards."7 The arbi-
trator held that the grievant had just cause to suspect that operating
a certain crane might endanger his life; at the same time the arbitra-
tor found that had the employer tested the crane at the time of the
grievant's refusal, the grievant would have had little reason to fear
for his safety."'
Grievants who cannot stand behind the protective shield of Shul-
man's exception are, of course, subject to imposition of a penalty. As
Arbitrator Bressler described the situation in Lancaster Electro
Plating, the grievant, who took the chance that she could prove she
had a reasonable belief that the employer's instructions would en-
danger her safety and health, "gambled and lost.""0 Having lost,
such grievants must persuade the arbitrator that the penalty is ex-
94. Peabody Coal Co., 87 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1002, 1006 (1986) (Voltz, Arb.).
95. See, e.g., City of West Frankfort, 1990 BNA Unp. Lab. Arb. LEXIS 1292, at
*4 (Reilly, Arb.) ("He only heard [the superintendent] tell him to go home."). See
also T & J Indus., Inc., 79 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 697 (1982) (Clark, Arb.) where the
grievant alleged that his supervisor did not respond to the grievant's statement that
"he was going home if they didn't turn the heat back on." Id. at 698. When the
furnace was not lit and his work area remained cold the grievant went home. Id.
96. Laclede Gas Co., 39 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 833, 842 (1962) (Bothwell. Arb.)
(employer "was obligated to investigate [grievant's] present physical condition before
suspending him after he had based his refusal to work on [a previous] back injury."
Id. (first emphasis in original, second emphasis supplied)). See also Memphis Di-
nettes, Inc., 81 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 486, 488 (1983) (Welch, Arb.) (employer com-
pletely ignored grievant's health complaints as to why she could not perform the
work, and continued to ignore such complaint even after she produced written medi-
cal advice from the employer's doctor).
97. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 79 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 587 (1982) (McCol-
lister, Arb.).
98. Id. at 590.




cessive. Arbitral authority to modify penalties is well accepted. The
source of such authority resides in arbitrators' "power to discipline
and . . . finally settle and adjust the disputes before [them].' ' 0
Notwithstanding such power, arbitrators refrain from setting
aside a penalty imposed by an employer unless the grievant has
proven discrimination, unfairness, or capricious and arbitrary ac-
tion.' O Arbitrators consider the grievant's work record in determin-
ing the fairness of the penalty.10 2 Some influential factors are the
employee's prior service, length of service, performance, discipline
record, and, where relevant, her psychological state, attitude, 0 3 and
possibility of rehabilitation. Previous offenses, although an impor-
tant factor, are not "used to discover whether [grievant] was guilty
of the immediate or latest [infraction]." 4 Other mitigating circum-
stances arbitrators consider are the employer's past practice and
even the attitude and conduct of the charging supervisor. 00 A griev-
ant challenging a penalty may be encouraged to note that arbitra-
tors view the disciplinary system not as authority for meting out
punishment, but instead as having a corrective or rehabilitative
role.' O8
100. United Indus., 88 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 547, 553 (1986) (Baron, Arb.) (quot-
ing Harry H. Platt, The Arbitration Process in the Settlement of Labor Disputes, 31
J. A. JUDICATURE Soc'y 54, 58 (1947)). Arbitrator Baron cites a historical list of arbi-
tration cases in support of this view. However, contract or submission agreements can
expressly prohibit an arbitrator from modifying or reducing a penalty if the arbitrator
finds that the discipline or discharge was justified. Baron notes that most current
agreements do not contain such limiting clauses. Id.
101. See Department of the Air Force, 1990 BNA Unp. Lab Arb. LEXIS 1267 at
*13 (Neas and Tharp, Arbs.); United Indus., 88 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 547, 553 (1986)
(Baron, Arb.).
102. See Olin Corp., 90 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1206, 1215 (1988) (Fitzsimmons,
Arb.) (citing Borg-Warner Corp., 22 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 589, 596 (1954) (Larkin,
Arb.) ("In general . . . the past conduct of the employee in question is of concern to
the arbitrator called upon to review management's disciplinary action.")); United In-
dus., 88 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 547, 549 (1986) (Baron, Arb.).
103. In Hayes-Albion Corp., 73 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 819, 825 (1979) (Foster,
Arb.), the arbitrator's award reinstated the grievants without back pay because they
had sincerely believed there was a safety hazard; thus, their refusal was not a deliber-
ate defiance of supervisory authority. A condition of reinstatement was the grievants'
agreement to perform the buffing work upon the return to their jobs.
104. See Grief Bros. Cooperage Corp., 42 Lab Arb. Rep. (BNA) 555, 558-59 (1964)
(Daugherty, Arb.). See also Department of the Air Force, 1990 BNA Unp. Lab. Arb.
LEXIS 1267, at '21 (Neas and Tharp, Arbs.).
105. The arbitrator in City of Los Angeles, 1988 BNA Unp. Lab. Arb. LEXIS
2982 (Hoh, Arb.), considered grievant's rapid reversal of his initial refusal to work
and found the conduct of the supervisor in rejecting grievant's unconditional offer to
work an abuse of discretion. Grievant's length of service-twenty years of employ-
ment with the city-was also considered. Id. at *6-7.
106. See United Indus., 88 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 547, 549 (1986) (Baron, Arb.).
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III. THE SHULMAN EXCEPTION: Is IT APPLICABLE TO EMPLOYEES
WHO REFUSE TO WORK WITH AIDS VIcTiMs?
A. Operation of the Exception: Some Problems for Grievants
An employee who is disciplined or discharged for refusing to work
with an AIDS victim because of fear of contagion can raise a safety
and health issue. This section addresses whether such fear of conta-
gion provides a grievant with a viable defense under the Shulman
exception.
A candid response to the question is warranted. The proverbial
snowball in Hades would fare better than this grievant in arbitra-
tion. To satisfy the exception, the grievant must demonstrate the
existence of an unusual health hazard or similar sacrifice. Such proof
requires the grievant to state at the time of refusal her reason for
believing a risk of contagion from the AIDS virus exists. Pivotal to
the grievant's case is that her evidentiary offer meets the arbitral
standard of proof on this requirement. As previously discussed, even
though there is no uniform standard, arbitrators will use a sliding
scale to evaluate a grievant's belief that: (1) she in good faith be-
lieved there was a risk, (2) there was a reasonable basis for her be-
lief, or (3) there was, in fact, actual danger of imminent harm.' "
Two barriers confront the aforementioned grievant in the attempt
to establish some basis for her belief that a risk of contagion exists.
First, the existence of widespread medical information on the ways
AIDS is transmitted""8 tends to discount even a subjective good
faith belief.109 Good faith belief has been defined as "an honest be-
lief . . . and [a] freedom from knowledge of circumstances which
ought to put [that person] upon inquiry."110 With mass media cover-
age of each new scientific discovery relating to the AIDS virus, the
grievant will be hard-pressed to demonstrate an absence of knowl-
edge about the possibilities of casual transmission. Second, in most
cases the grievant's belief will have been formulated in the absence
of medical information on the health status of the AIDS victim em-
ployee, which in turn betrays nothing more than an unsupported
emotional reaction to the mere presence of the AIDS victim.
Even though a grievant who refuses a work order because of fear
of contagion cannot receive the protection of the Shulman excep-
tion, such evidentiary facts may warrant mitigation of the penalty,
as they did in Minnesota Department of Corrections.' Although
the grievant's refusal in that case did not involve another employee,
the case is important because of the union's strategy of proffering a
107. See supra text accompanying notes 62-65.
108. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
109. A similar problem confronts the employee under the federal labor statutes
discussed supra note 38 and accompanying text.
110. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 693 (6th ed. 1990).
111. 85 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1185 (1985) (Gallagher. Arb.).
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subjective belief standard. The grievant, a prison guard, refused to
obey an order to conduct a pat search after memoranda informed
the prison community that a new inmate had contracted the AIDS
virus. Arbitrator Gallagher found that discharge of the grievant
would have been appropriate except for two mitigating factors.
First, the employer was at least partly responsible for the grievant's
exaggerated fear because of statements in the warden's memoran-
dum, "which recommended against the sharing of cigarettes and ad-
vised the washing of hands ... ."I" The memorandum further
warned, "'No one really knows all the ways AIDs [sic] is transmit-
ted, so be careful.' "113 Second, after denying the grievant's request
to wear gloves to conduct the pat search, the warden changed his
mind and permitted other guards to wear gloves in response to their
fear of contamination. As a result, the grievant was awarded rein-
statement without back pay." 4 If the union's subjective belief stan-
dard had been accepted, the grievant might not have suffered a pen-
alty. A discussion of the union's proffered belief standard follows.
B. A New Theory: Fashioning a "Realistic Belief" Standard
The union's strategy in Minnesota Department of Corrections is
significant because it offers a guide to fashioning a "realistic" belief
standard under the Shulman exception when an employee refusing a
work assignment raises the fear of AIDS contagion. Aware that the
grievant lacked the evidence to meet an objective standard of proof
(which would have required a scientific measurement of the risk of
contracting AIDS from a pat search), the union pressed for applica-
tion of a different standard. The union urged not a reasonable good-
faith subjective standard, but a standard that used the grievant's
perception-as influenced by the employer's conduct-as the mea-
sure of the risk. The warden's memorandum was a precipitating
force in the grievant's fear. After reading the memorandum, the
grievant told his supervisor that he was "scared to death of this vi-
rus," and wanted to know "how can it be guaranteed that I'm not
going to contract this disease and take it home?"'1 5 The crux of the
union's "realistic belief' standard was that the grievant's perception
of the risk should be anchored to the conduct of the employer.
The union's approach would have allowed the grievant the protec-
tion of Shulman's exception, resulting in the grievant's reinstate-
ment without penalty. Instead, the arbitrator rejected the union's
proffered realistic belief standard, which in turn eliminated the ex-
ception. This meant that Daugherty's guidelines for determining
just cause continued to operate. As a result, the arbitrator allowed
112. Id. at 1190.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1186-87.
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the evidence of the warden's conduct to be presented as a mitigating
factor on the seventh criterion, viz., fairness of the penalty.
This Article posits that a grievant's realistic belief regarding con-
tagiousness of the AIDS virus, as influenced by the employer's con-
duct, should be the standard applied by arbitrators in AIDS-related
refusal-to-work cases. An employer cannot ignite or ignore a work
force in panic due to the presence of an AIDS victim and then bring
charges against employees who refuse assignments with the victim.
The spread of the AIDS crisis to the work force dictates positive
employer action to respond to employees' fears. An employer can
create a harmonious and sensitive workplace atmosphere in place of
pandemonium through promulgating AIDS-related policies and in-
stituting planned programs to educate the workforce about the dis-
ease.1 1 6 In Minnesota Department of Corrections the union had re-
quested that the employer develop AIDS-related policies affecting
the working conditions of the guards. The employer never re-
sponded to the union's request.
The role of the arbitrator is straightforward in the case of an em-
ployer without a policy or educational program who is confronted
with an employee who refuses an assignment with an AIDS victim
because of fear of contagion. In this situation, the Shulman excep-
tion would be allowed where the grievant's evidence established that
the employer's action (whether one of commission or omission) in
failing to maintain a rational work atmosphere contributed, at least
in part, to a fearful work environment where an AIDS victim is
present.
However, where the employer proffers evidence that an AIDS pol-
icy statement and educational program had been instituted and the
grievant challenges the effectiveness or adequacy of either, the arbi-
trator must examine the policy and the program. This role of the
arbitrator is not unique in health and safety cases where the work
site and conditions must be considered in order to assess the justifi-
cation for a grievant's realistic belief about the risk. In examining
the effectiveness of the employer's AIDS-related policy and educa-
tional program, the arbitrator might consider the following factors:
1. Whether there is a published statement that clearly sets forth
the employer's commitment to providing (a) fair and nondiscrimina-
tory treatment to all employees and (b) a safe workplace that meets
116. An education would have prevented the AIDS-related work situation which
cost the District of Columbia $20,000 in damages. While interviewing an AIDS victim.
a Department of Human Services (DHS) caseworker accused him of "purposely try-
ing to communicate the disease by coughing on her," asked him to move away from
her, and held a piece of paper up to her face when he talked. The Commission on
Human Rights ordered DHS not only to pay damages, but to provide AIDS education
and sensitivity training to 368 workers in the department. Patrice Gaines-Carter.




or exceeds federal and state standards. 1 7
2. Whether the policy statement was communicated to employees
and whether the method of communication illustrated the serious-
ness of the employer in maintaining a harmonious work
environment.
3. Whether the employer, prior to the AIDS-related work refusal,
implemented a credible educational or counseling program to pro-
vide information and to answer employees' questions on the AIDS
virus.
4. Whether employees knew of the educational or counseling pro-
gram and whether the program included understandable medical
facts concerning how the disease is and is not transmitted and legal
issues concerning the rights of the AIDS victim and co-workers.
5. Whether there was an established plan to respond to an AIDS-
related problem in the workplace." s
C. The Rationale for Adopting a "Realistic Belief" Standard
In October 1986 the Surgeon General of the United States issued
a public report on AIDS acknowledging a disease epidemic that "has
killed thousands of people [and] . . . brought fear to the hearts of
most Americans." 19 The Surgeon General's report urged labor and
management to prepare for AIDS so that misinformation about the
disease is kept to a minimum and recommended that "[o]ffices, fac-
tories, and other work sites . . . have a plan in operation for educa-
tion of the work force and accommodation of AIDS or ARC [AIDS-
117. Of course, there can be no specific rules as to the required language of a
policy statement. Nevertheless, most companies will take one of three approaches in
drafting a policy statement: (1) The life-threatening illness approach, which treats
AIDS no differently than any other terminal illness; (2) The AIDS-specific approach
which sets forth a company's commitment to deal with AIDS in the workplace in a
humanitarian fashion; (3) The deliberate no-policy approach, where the employer
views AIDS as an illness which is covered under the company's health and disability
policies. The third approach calls for close scrutiny by the arbitrator to determine
whether the company has shared in an effective way with employees a clear and well-
articulated view of the safety of employees working with an AIDS victim, and con-
veyed that discrimination against the AIDS victim will not be tolerated. Three refer-
ences that may be useful in designing policy statements are VICTOR SCHACITER &
THOMAS E. GEIDT, WHEN AN EMPLOYEE HAS AIDS (1989); SAM B. PUCKETT & ALAN R.
EMERY, MANAGING AIDS IN THE WORKPLACE (1988); RICHARD H. WEXLER, AIDS IN
THE WORKPLACE: A MANAGER'S GUIDE (Focus: Prentice-Hall Personnel Management
Series, Dec. 1987).
118. In addition to the in-house educational or counseling program, the employer
may, on having a worker diagnosed with AIDS, provide in-house professional counsel-
ing to help employees cope with emotions in working with a fellow worker whose
physical condition is terminal and deteriorates before their eyes.
119. C. EVERETT Koop, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, SURGEON
GENERAL'S REPORT ON ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME 3 (1986).
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related complex] patients before the first such case appears at the
work site."' °
In spite of the Surgeon General's report, many employers have
been slow to respond to this creeping workplace crisis."' Responsi-
ble surveys reveal that business leaders' knowledge and attitudes
about AIDS are no better than the general public's. One study found
that almost forty percent of the companies surveyed would limit
contact between employees with AIDS and co-workers, sixteen per-
cent would encourage workers with AIDS or with HIV (human im-
munodeficiency virus-the AIDS virus) to resign, and thirty percent
would tell co-workers confidential information about workers with
AIDS without consent.' 2 A growing segment of company adminis-
trators has urged businesses to institute educational programs as a
fundamental vehicle for communicating to the work force factual in-
formation about the disease. Supporters of these programs point out
they would "help to clarify perceptions of a worker's own risk be-
havior, demystify the disease, and manage unwarranted fears."" 3
Nonetheless, a survey of businesses located in cities with a high pop-
ulation density reveals that a disappointingly low number of compa-
nies have instituted formal policies regarding the disease. For exam-
ple, in Chicago ninety-six percent of the 255 businesses responding
stated they did not have a formal AIDS policy and eighty-nine per-
cent had no plans to institute one in the near future; in New York
ninety-two percent of 120 companies responding had no formal pol-
icy and eighty-three percent plan none; ninety-four percent of the
263 respondents in Detroit had no formal policy and eighty percent
plan none; and in the Cleveland area eighty-eight percent of 96 re-
sponding had no formal policy and ninety-five percent plan none."
Management and labor in the federal sector have made greater
progress than their private-sector counterparts in confronting the
impending workforce crisis. The Office of Personnel Management
(OPM) has issued AIDS guidelines or policies for federal employers
that are designed to assist federal agencies in establishing effective
120. Id. at 32.
121. Mead Corporation's employee relations director characterized the growing
epidemic in workplace terms, stating "[ilt's not a question of whether ... companies
will have a problem-it's a question of when." Business Gets An Outline for AIDS
Response, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Dec. 11, 1988, Jobs, at 1. A study of 151 Fortune 500
companies found thirty-three percent had reported cases of employees with AIDS.
and another fifty percent believed they would encounter the disease in the near fu-
ture. WEXLER, supra note 117, at 5.
122. Ira D. Singer, AIDS Concerns for Business, NATION'S BUSINESS, June 1989. at
75.
123. Id. See also Linda Saslow, AIDS on the Job: Businesses Fight Fears and
Prejudices, N.Y. Pums, Jan. 8, 1989, § 12LI, at 1; Business Gets an Outline for AIDS
Response, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Dec. 11, 1988, Jobs, at 1.
124. Shuara Wilson, Poll: AIDS Worries at Firms Don't Lead to Formal Policies.
CRAINS CLEVELAND BUSINESS, Mar. 20, 1989, at 1.
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AIDS education programs and in handling AIDS-related personnel
situations in the workplace. 25 Agencies are encouraged to institute
such education programs prior to an AIDS-related problem situation
because the level of employee receptivity to accurate information is
higher at that point. OPM's guidelines specifically address the work-
place situation where co-workers express reluctance or threaten re-
fusal to work with an AIDS victim:
OPM recognizes that the presence of [employees'] fears, if unad-
dressed in an appropriate and timely manner, can be disruptive to
an organization. Usually an agency will be able to deal effectively
with such situations through information, counseling, and other
means. However, in situations where such measures do not solve
the problem and where management determines that an em-
ployee's unwarranted threat or refusal to work with an HIV-in-
fected employee is impeding or disrupting the organization's work,
it should consider appropriate corrective or disciplinary action
against the threatening or disruptive employee(s). 26
Noteworthy is the fact that OPM recommends corrective or discipli-
nary action only after the threatening or disruptive employee has
had an opportunity to participate in a planned educational or infor-
mational program about the disease.
On the federal labor side, the National Treasury Employees
Union (NTEU) has instructed its locals to work with agency man-
agement to implement workshops and other programs "to reduce or
prevent irrational actions and attitudes" about AIDS contagion.
Moreover, NTEU has set forth a clear and firm policy on the issue
of AIDS-related workplace problems: NTEU will not defend co-
workers who refuse to work with an AIDS victim-employee based on
fear of contagion, nor will NTEU support efforts by a co-worker to
be removed from an environment in which a person with AIDS
works.
OPM's and NTEU's hard-line position in dealing with disobedient
co-workers is fair. Their policies or guidelines offer a balanced ap-
proach which ensures management's authority to maintain disci-
pline for effective operation of the business (government) and advo-
cates preventive measures in order that employees' fear of contagion
is addressed before it produces a problem situation.
One writer has described vividly what the workplace environment
of a business would be where an AIDS policy and a planned educa-
tional program have not been implemented:
Being unprepared for dealing with employees who contract AIDS
can have a devastating effect on morale and productivity in the
workplace.. . . As co-workers watch an individual become increas-
125. OPA's AIDS Guidelines for Federal Employers, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No.
56, at D-1 (Mar. 23, 1988).
126. Id.
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ingly ill from complications of AIDS, they may be emotionally af-
fected as they rarely have been before. It's a heavy burden for con-
cerned co-workers to know that the individual's chance of survival
is less than 50% over an 18-month period and that there is little
they can do but sympathize. Depression, anxiety, and a host of
other intense emotions will certainly affect the workplace in ways
unprepared managers can hardly imagine. The problems become
intensified because, unlike many other terminal illnesses, concern
will be generated among employees that AIDS disease can some-
how be transmitted to them or to their families. The emotional
drain on co-workers, sympathy for the people with AIDS will be
complicated with a fear for their own safety.2 7
Avoidance of AIDS-related workplace problems comes only
through preplanning. Lawyers must advise their corporate clients or
employers to undertake such preplanning and can offer the rationale
presented in this Article. In addition, the employer must be advised
to confer with union representatives when fashioning an AIDS pol-
icy statement and educational program. These efforts of labor and
management will insure that the new policies and programs are con-
sistent with the collective bargaining contract and succeed in win-
ning employees' acceptance. Consequently, arbitrators will be able
to rule on these health and safety grievances in a way that best bal-
ances the rights and obligations of the parties to the agreements.
IV. CONCLUSION: FAIRNESS AND AN IMPENDING CRISIS DICTATE
POSITIVE WORKPLACE ACTION
Fairness to employees requires workplace educational programs
and policies addressing AIDS to (1) ensure that proper signals are
sent to employees from supervisors' conduct in relating to AIDS vic-
tims, and (2) offset and counteract sensationalized news coverage
with current scientific information. When employees are aware of
news reports such as those that tell of a new strain of the AIDS
virus (HIV-2) which lingers in the body for twenty years;' 28 or a
worldwide tuberculosis epidemic fueled by the virus,'20 or patients
being infected with AIDS by their dentist, 30 one must question
whether the employees' fears, when not addressed through a
planned educational program, are really irrational.
Where an employer has not instituted a policy and an educational
program to address AIDS-related problem situations prior to their
occurrence or has contributed to the situation, fairness to the em-
127. WEXLER, supra note 117, at 7-8.
128. Amy Goldstein, Maryland Finds Rare Form of AIDS Virus in 4, WASHING-
TON PosT, Aug. 3, 1991, at B3.
129. Richard A. Knox, AIDS Linked to Tuberculosis Epidemic, BOSTON GLOBE,
May 21, 1990, at 1.
130. Michael Kinsley, Doctors, AIDS and A Costly Long Shot. WASINGTON Posr,
July 25, 1991, at A17.
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ployee dictates that such evidence be allowed to establish the requi-
site belief about the risk of contagion under the Shulman exception.
Evidence of the employer's conduct-in particular, a failure to insti-
tute an educational program and policy to neutralize employees'
fear-should not be relegated to an element of penalty mitigation.
When the standard of proof for the belief requirement is measured
by the employee's perception anchored to the employer's conduct,
the workplace will grow to more realistically reflect a workforce con-
tending with the arrival of a deadly disease epidemic.
